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Lutz mistakenly believed it was his own property, and hence, did
not have a hostile, intent.
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Fuld, reasoned:
(1) that the test of evidence should be formulated in light of the
Practice Act's object, i. e., an enclosure, or cultivation, or improve-
ment sufficient to convey to the real owner knowledge of the
usurper's claim, and that here the evidence met that test; (2) the
fact that Lutz knew.he did not have title to the premises is imma-
terial, for good faith is not necessary for a claim of title, it being
sufficient that Lutz intended to acquire the property as his own.
The effect of the decision would seem to be to work a substan-
tial alteration of the now traditional understanding of claim of
title. Traditionally, claim of title meant the intent to claim the land
as one 's own; good faith and mistake as elements had been interred
in the distant past. For the court to ressurect their forms today
has the following results: A., who occupies B's land, knowing it
is B's land, does not have a claim of title, because he did not enter
in good faith believing the land to be his own; A., who occupies
B's land, believing it to be his own land, does not have a claim of
title, either, because by his mistake he did not enter in hostility to
B. As a consequence, the concept of claim of title is now reduced
to one rare and novel situation: A., who occupies B's land, recog-
nizes that title in the premise is in dispute, but he believes he has
a claim to it (ergo, good faith), and that B. also has a claim to it
(ergo, hostility), but that he, A., intends to assert his superior
right.
It is submitted that the Court's redefinition of claim of title,
taken at face value, has greatly confined the doctrine of adverse
possession in New York. Since this redefinition conflicts with the
policy underlaying the doctrine of adverse possession, i. e., to bar
the delinqent owner's right to redress the adverse occupation of
his land, it is submitted the decision is erroneous. Consequently,
a doubt arises whether Van Vnlkenbur.q v. Lutz will be strictly
followed.
Mortqages
In the case of Shohfi v. Shohfi'0 the Court of Appeals was
presented with an interesting aspect of the legal problem in-
volved in accepting a deed which states it is "subject to a mort-
gage." The defendant was the husband of the plaintiff. He had
acquired title to a'parcel of land in 1929 by a conveyance from
his wife. In return, he gave her a bond and purchase money mort-
10. 303 N. Y. 370, 103 N. E. 2d 330 (1952).
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gage. The husband never paid anything on the principal and
stopped paying interest in 1933. In 1934 he reconveyed the prem-
ises to his wife to keep and manage for him, with a stipulation
that the mortgage should not merge. In 1947, the husband sued
to recover the property, and the trial court ordered the recon-
veyance "subject to the mortgage thereon", which reconveyance
the wife executed and the husband accepted. The present action
by the wife was on the bond and mortgage. The trial court sus-
tained the husband's defense that the action was barred by the
statute of limitations. The Appellate Division reversed,1 argu-
ing that by accepting the deed "subject to the mortgage" the hus-
band had acknowledged the debt and set the statute running anew.
The Court of Appeals reinstated the trial court's decision, there-
by sustaining the defense of the statute of limitations. The
cases cited by both opinions in the Court of Appeals involve basic
principles of real property law.
'Where a grantee accepts a deed which states that he assumes
the mortgage of the grantor, he becomes personally liable to the
mortgagee for the amount of the mortgage indebtedness. 2 While
there is accord in the rule, there is departure in the reasoning
sustaining it; some courts support it on a theory of equitable
subrogation ;13 other courts support it on the theory of a third
party beneficiary contract.' New York follows the later ration-
ale.' 5 But by either rationale, in a suit by the mortgagee against
a grantee who has assumed to pay the mortgage, the grantee is
barred from defending on the ground that the mortgagee is in-
valid,'6 or usurious, 17 or that the mortgage debt was barred by
the statute of limitations at the time he accepted the deed.'8
The problem grows more complex where the grantee accepts
a deed subject to a mortgage, as distinguished from an assumption
of the mortgage. As a first principle, it is quite clear that the
11. 277 App. Div. 390, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 497 (2d Dep't 1951).
12. Trotter v. Hughes, 12 N. Y. 74 (1854). *
13. Herd v. Twohy, 133 Cal. 55, 65 Pac. 139 (1901) ; Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S.
610 (1890).
14. Cumberland rat. Bank v. St. Clair, 93 Me. 35, 44 AtI. 123 (1899); Keddle v.
Flack, 27 Neb. 836, 44 N. W. 34 (1889).
15. Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178 (1861); Thorp v. Keokuh Coal Co., 48 N. Y.
253 (1872).
16. Parkinson v. Sherinan, 74 N. Y. 88 (1878).
17. Hartley v. Harrison, 24 N. Y. 170 (1861).
18. Beddle v. Pugh, 59 N. J. Eq. 480, 45 AtI. 626 (1900); Hollister v. York, 59
Vt 1, 9 AUt. 2 (1886).
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grantee is under no personal liability, and that the land alone is
responsible for the mortgage debt.19 If the mortgage is valid
and enforceable, a default in payment leaves the land subject to
foreclosure. However, if when the grantee accepts his deed sub-
ject to a mortgage, the mortgage is defective, or unenforceable
-under the statute of limitations, he may contest the foreclosure
on those grounds.20 But an exception to this right to contest a
foreclosure exists where it can be shown that consideration, us-
ually a reduction in purchase price, was given by the grantor to
the grantee for the latter's undertaking to accept the deed sub-
ject to a mortgage.2 Where such an undertaking can be shown,
the grantee is barred on the principle of estoppel, or of a third
party beneficiary contract, from contesting the foreclosure on the
grounds that when he accepted the deed the mortgage was void
or its enforcement barred.22
Applying these principles to the present case, the claim of
the minority that the husband was a grantee who took subject
to the mortgage and consequently was estopped from contesting
the validity of the foreclosure, was properly refuted by the
majority, which pointed out that there was no purchase of the
mortgaged premises by the husband. The case does not fall with-
in the exception, assuming the validity of the argument made by
the minority that these principles apply, because there is no
showing that the husband, because of a reduction in the purchase
price, undertook to subject his land to the mortgage.
The majority attacked the dissent's assumption that the
principles relating to a grantee taking subject to a mortgage are
applicable here. It is submitted that the position of the majority
was correct; the husband was not a grantee receiving land; he
was the owner recovering it. Hence, the problem was purely one
of acknowledgement by a debtor of his debt so as to start the
statute of limitations running again. Acknowledgement is a
matter of intent. The Court found that the acceptance of the deed
was not sufficient to sustain the inference of an acknowledgement.
By so doing, it avoided the obstacle of ,rviL PRACTICE ACT §59,
which requires that an acknowledgement be in writing and signed
19. Dingeldein v. Third Ave. R. R., 37 N. Y. 575 (1868).
20. Fontana Land Co. v. Laughlin, 199 Cal. 625, 250 Pac. 669 (1926); Purdy v.
Coar, 109 N. Y. 448, 17 N. E. 352 (1888).
21. Doran v. Doran, 145 Ia. 122, 123 N. W. 996 (1908) ; Central National Bank of
Boston v. Hazard, 30 F. 484 (1887); Freeman v. Auld, 44 N. Y. 50 (1876).
22. Doran v. Doran, supra n. 21; Freeman v. Auld, supra n. 21; Bennett v. Bates,
94 N. Y. 354 (1884); Parkinson v. Sherman, supra n. 16; Hartley v. Harrison, supra
n. 17.
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by the party to be charged, and the further problem of whether a
court has the power to lift the statute of limitations by a condi-
tional decree.
Future Interests
The institution of adoption is ancient. Yet, anomalous as it
may be, the common law provided no method for the legal adop-
tion of children. Consequently, an adopted- child had no rights
of inheritance where the foster parent died intestate; and where
a will was left, the question as to whether the terms "children",
"issue", etc., could be construed to include adopted children was
precluded.23 Fortunately, the common law was changed by statute
in New York in 1887.24 Since then the legislature25 and the courtsg
have gradually but continuously enlarged and expanded the rights
of adopted children to equal those of natural children. But one
significant exception 'stands out: DOMEsTIc REL TioKs LAw §115
states: "(A)s respects the passing and limitatioh over of real
or personal property dependent under the provisions of any in-
strument on the foster parent dying without heir, the foster child
is not deemed'the child of the foster parent so as to defeat the
rights of remaindermen . .. ."
The first adjudication by the Court of Appeals dealing with
§115 arose in Matter of LeaskY.2  There the testator died leaving
a life estate in X., and upon X's death leaving children, then to
such children; but if no children, then to the residuary estate.
During X's life estate he adopted a son. The court declared that
the testator, by using the word leaving, intended that only natural
offspring should take. Consequently, the remainder estate passed
to the residuary legatees. The significance of the decision lies
in the Court's approach to the problem, an approach based on
the intention of the testator.
The same method was followed by the court in In Re Up-
john's WilZ, decided this year.28 Frederick Upjohn was the tes-
tator. His niece, Mrs. Childs, adopted a two month old daughter
23. RESTATEmT,,0PRorErY § 287, Comment on Subsection (1) a.
24. L 1887, c. 703.
25. For the legislative development see N. Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW §§ 109-118a.
26. The more significant decisions are Carpenter v. Buffalo General Elec. Co., 213
N. Y. 101, 106 N. E. 1026 (1914),; Matter of Walter's Estate, 270 N. Y. 201, 200 N. E.
786 (1936) ; Matter of Guilnartin's Will, 277 N. Y. 689, 14 N. E. 2d 627 (1938); Matter
of Horn, 256 N. Y. 294, 200 N. E. 786 (1931).
27. 197 N. Y. 193, 90 N. E. 652 (1910).
28. 304 N. Y. 366, 107 N. E. 2d 492 (1952).
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